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1. Introduction
In the last fteen years the American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) corporation, the
largest provider of landline phone and broadband television services in the US, has also
become the second largest provider of mobile telephone. This position was achieved through
a certain number of integration contracts. For instance, in 2000 AT&T spent $US1.4 billion
to buy a 32% share of Net2Phone, a software/services company principally specialized in
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-based and PacketCable-based Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) networks. Despite the integration did not lead to the full control of Net2Phone,
thereafter AT&T was able to inuence strategically Net2Phones business with other rms
in the telecommunication industry.
In 2003, AT&T Wireless and Cingular Wireless formed a joint venture (JV) to expand
their Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and General Packet Radio Service
(GPRS) wireless technologies along 3000 miles of interstate highways in Mid-western and
Western states which were not covered yet. The two partners had a fty-fty control over
the JV. At the time, AT&T and Cingular provided substitutable wireless services. The JV
probably dampened detrimental competition among them, and it also reduced strategically
the need for further alliances with other competitors.
These two anecdotes suggest that rms might engage in JVs or minority stakes integration
(MS) to pursue strategic objective, beyond the mere exploitation of internal synergies. In
many cases, this might happen even when the acquisition of full control is a viable option.
An integration contract yields two types of e¤ects. First, a productivity e¤ect, which
consists in the improvement or the worsening of the partnersproduction function. This e¤ect
is positive if there are substantial complementarities among their resources (e.g., synergies,
better organization, economies of scale). It is negative if joint production gives rise to
diseconomies which outweigh complementarities (e.g., organizational issues, mist of business
cultures). Second, a strategic e¤ect, which is due to a change in the partnersmarket power
against competitors, customers, upstream suppliers and other trading parties. Also this
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second e¤ect could be negative, as integration may exacerbate detrimental competition with
third parties, or increase their ability to hold up the partners.1 Then it is not obvious that
an integration contract guarantees higher prots to the partners.
Using the approach of cooperative games, Segal (2003) is able to provide quite general
conditions for the protability of an M&A contract. This contract gives one partner the
control over 100% of the other partners resources. His seminal model, however, is not able
to explain why rms often engage in integration contracts and alliances that transfer less
than 100% control over resources. We extend his model in this direction, allowing for MS
and JV. Adopting the same cooperative approach we characterize protability conditions for
these forms of integration. We show that, under certain conditions, less than 100% control
is more protable than the full control over the partners resources.
Let us illustrate the intuition with an example. Consider three rms in the telecommuni-
cation business: i, j and k. Firm i provides mobile telephone services using an infrastructure
A owned by k. Firm j develops and supplies two types of software, B and C. Software B
is sold to k and to other users, but it is essential to ks business. Software C is sold to k
only, but it is not essential for k. Suppose i acquires 100% control of j: the latter cannot
sell software without is permission. Suppose there is a positive productivity e¤ect, due to
complementarities between i and j. But there are also two strategic e¤ects of mutual depen-
dence at work. The rst one is positive for the integrating partners: j cannot sell software
B to k before i hasnt agreed to rent the infrastructure A from k. This e¤ect increases rm
is ability to hold up k.
The second strategic e¤ect is negative: k can threat i not to buy software C if the price
paid by i to rent the infrastructure is too low. This second e¤ect increases ks ability to
hold up i. The protability of the acquisition depends on the relative strength of these two
1An example of increased detrimental competition (with a negative strategic e¤ect) is the business
stealing e¤ect(Stigler, 1950). When two rms merge, their joint output typically decreases. Competitors
operating in the same market (but not taking part in the merger) react by increasing their market shares.
As we will show later, the occurrence of such e¤ect depends on the degree of substitutability between the
competitorsresources and the resources of integrating partners.
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e¤ects. However, the two partners can do better than the full acquisition. Suppose i and j
sign a MS contract which gives the former the control over software B only. Thus, j can sell
software C independently of i, with the consequence that ks ability to hold up i does not
increase. It is apparent that the MS allows the partners to make more prots than the full
acquisition.
As mentioned earlier, strategic e¤ects are negative when integration increases detrimen-
tal competition with third parties. To see it, suppose that, in addition to what has been
described above, rm k and rm j sell a similar product in market D. They are substitutable
in that market. Suppose i acquires 100% of j, but it is not able to supply market D until it
has rented infrastructure A. This gives k the chance to stealpart of market D. In a way,
this happens because is full control over js resources lowers the substitutability between j
and k in market D: Also in this case a MS contract that gives j the ability to supply market
D independently of i would perform better than the full acquisition.
Segal (2003) shows that an M&A contract which assigns partner i the full control over
js resources is protable if, in the presence of i, the complementarity of third parties with
js resources is lower. The reason is that when i controls js resources third partieshold-up
power is lower. Similarly, if in the presence of i the substitutability between j and third
parties increases, then integration is protable. The reason being that letting i control
js resources lowers detrimental competition with third parties. The theoretical model in
this paper reformulates Segals condition, saying that an M&A contract is protable if the
complementarity of third parties with the joint resources of i and j is lower than the sum of
third partiescomplementarity with i and j, separately.2 Our model provides protability
conditions also for MS and JV contracts.
We claim that whenever the protability conditions are satised, gains from integration
are higher, and we nd support in the data. Our empirical goal is testing the e¤ect of
2Hereafter, we will refer to substitutability as the case where complementarity is negative. Thus, if
complementarity is negative, lower (higher) complementarityimplies that substitutability is higher (lower).
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changing the complementarity structure of rms on the post-integration prots. Thus our
empirical strategy is the following. First, we assume that rms choose a certain type of
integration unaware of the changes in complementarities possibly caused by the contract.
Namely, we assume that the choice of a contract is not a¤ected by protability conditions
whose validity has not been tested yet. Second, we measure the average impact on prots in
all cases where the changes in complementarity satisfy those conditions, and we nd support.
An additional contribution of this paper is in the denition of an index to measure re-
source complementarity among rms. It addresses a measurement complexity issue arising
from the fact that rms are usually involved in di¤erent businesses, each of them belonging
to di¤erent sectors. The index accounts for dynamic complexity, due to the fact that comple-
mentarity between pairs of industrial sectors changes over time as a result of new products
and/or technologies.
In order to build the complementarity index and test theoretical predictions, we use Orbis
and Zephyr databases (Bureau Van Dijk) which refer to 8106 US listed companies that signed
an integration contract in the period 2002-2007. Contracts involved companies operating in
90 di¤erent primary industrial sectors.
In the cases of full acquisition (M&A), partnersprots increase on average by 4:49% for
any increase in the complementarity index between acquiror and third parties and by 0:37%
for a decrease in the complementarity between target and third parties. This means that the
strategic e¤ect is positive. As for the productivity e¤ect, data show that return on assets
falls down by 4:33% if the integration is associated with an increase in the complementarity
index between the partners. Thus the productivity e¤ect is negative when controlling for
the strategic e¤ect. This supports the idea that in many cases M&As are motivated by the
objective of strategically gaining market power rather than gaining e¢ ciency.
A MS gives partner i the ability to control a share  of js resources ( < 1=2). Data
show that prots increase on average by 1:51% from a minority partnership if the protability
condition is satised. Additional 4:58% occur for each decrease in js complementarity with
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third parties. As in the case of an M&A, complementarity between partners has a negative
e¤ect on prots ( 4:7%). The model shows that a MS is preferable to an M&A if the
complementarity of third parties with i and the controlled share of js resources is smaller
than their complementarity with i and js resources as a whole.3 In our data, all other things
being equal the average performance of a MS is 3:6% higher than an M&A.
A JV gives rise to a new independent entity, endowed with an amount of resources
conferred by the partners on the basis of equity shares. The theoretical protability condition
says that a JV is protable if the complementarity of third parties with the new entity is
lower than their complementarity with the conferred resources separately. In other words,
a JV is protable if allowing the JV to control the conferred resources as a whole implies
that third parties lose part of their hold-up power (or their ability to stealshares of the
partnersmarket).
Data show that, if the protability condition is satised, a JV yields an average increase of
2:2% in return on assets - an even higher e¤ect compared to a MS. In addition, prots increase
(+3:5%) if the partners complementarity with third parties is higher (or substitutability is
lower). This provides an evidence of a strong strategic e¤ect. Di¤erently from the other two
contracts, the productivity e¤ect of a JV is positive (+2:5%), but smaller in size compared
to the strategic e¤ect.
These empirical ndings suggest two general results. First, contracts which transfer less
than full control of a partners resources on average have a larger positive impact on the
partnersjoint prots. Second, the relative importance of the strategic e¤ect is larger for
this kind of contracts.
The cooperative game approach to integration contracts dates back to the seminal works
of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), who, in contrast to the Coasian
logic, focussed on limits to contractibility. They showed that changing the ownership of
3In case of substitutability, a MS is more protable than an M&A if the substitutability of third parties
with i and the controlled share of js resources is higher than their substitutability with i and js resources
as a whole.
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a collection of assets a¤ects bargaining power, and then the distribution of surplus. This
yields two e¤ects. First, given ex-post e¢ ciency, the owners can capture a larger share
of ex-post surplus. Second, the prospect of a larger share leads the agents to undertake
non-contractible actions ex-ante, which in turn may prompt ex-post e¢ ciency. Relatedly,
the enormous literature originated by Grossman and Harts works can be split in two big
strands. The rst strand studies how ownership structures provide appropriate incentives to
ex-ante investments that enhance e¢ ciency.4 The present paper belongs to a second strand,
that is mainly focused on exploring how integration contracts or partnerships occurring
prior to production, a¤ect nal allocations resulting from bargaining with common third
parties (e.g., Davidson, 1988; Horn and Wolinsky, 1988; Chipty and Snyder, 1999; Stole and
Zwiebel, 2008; Elliott, 2015). The most related work is Segal (2003). He provides a very
general framework to study how substitutability/complementarity of integrating partners
a¤ects their ability to hold-up third parties. As mentioned earlier, we build on his work,
allowing for collusion contracts that transfer less than full control.
The idea that partners that acquire a minority stake can exert some degree of inuence
on the target rm ties our work to the corporate nance literature that studies the power of
minority shareholding. Bhagat and Brickley (1984) show that minorities are able to inuence
the election of some board members even if the majority opposes their election.5 Butz (1994)
points to the fact that minorities are inuential because they can threat the CEO to purchase
more shares in order to acquire majority control. Ciccotello and Hornyak (2000) study the
minoritys power in joint ventures. Elfenbein and Lerner (2012) show that the allocation of
property rights is chosen according to the relative bargaining power, and how it may lead to
increased performance of the partners. These contributions belong to a wider mainstream
literature exploring how the allocation of ownership rights inuences the performance of
4For a recent and comprehensive survey, see Legros and Newman (2014).
5Often minorities vote on key managerial decisions such as mergers and acquisitions (Bethel et al., 2009),
thus investors may acquire voting rights just to inuence the outcome of M&A proposals (Hu and Black,
2007).
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the alliances (see Kloyer, 2011; Bodnaruk et al., 2013; Haeussler and Higgins, 2014; Prange
and Mayrhofer, 2015 for an overview). Di¤erently from us, this literature focusses on the
minority-majority relationship within the rm. We study minority shareholdings e¤ects
outside the rm. Namely, we study the e¤ects on horizontalcompetition with other rms,
and the e¤ect on verticaltrade with suppliers and customers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the cooperative game model to
study integration contracts, and characterizes protability conditions. Section 3 introduces
the complementarity index. Section 4 presents the database and some descriptive statistics.
Section 5 tests theoretical predictions. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be a set of agents in the game. Agents can be rms competing in the
same sector, rms in the upstream or downstream sectors, and customers. Let 2N denote
the set of all possible subsets of agents. They own perfectly divisible and summable assets
A = fa1; :::; ang with control structure C(S) 2 C, where C is the set of all mappings from
2N to RjSj. The set function C(S) denes the assets controlled by the subset S of agents.
We will refer sometimes to S as a coalition of agents.
To illustrate how C(S) denes the assets controlled by coalition S, take for instance
S = fi; jg (with i; j 2 N). Let hi be the share of agent hs assets controlled by agent i,
and let hj be the share of agent hs assets controlled by agent j, (h = 1; ::; n). Therefore,
C(fi; jg) =
P
h2N 
h
i ah;
P
h2N 
h
j ah
	
with
P
h2N 
h
k = 1 for all k 2 N .
Let (N; v) be a game with characteristic function v(S;C(S)) : 2N  C ! R, for any
coalition S  N . An integration contract has the e¤ect of changing the control structure of
the game. In order to simplify notation, let v(S;C(S))  vC(S).
The timing of events is the following. At period 0 two players, i and j, sign an integration
contract. At period 1 all players play the game and split total payo¤s according to the
following solution.
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Let pi(S) be the probability of any coalition S not containing i,
Denition 1. (Weber, 1988) A solution (vC) =

1(v
C); ::; n(v
C)
	
is a probabilistic value
of game vC if for all i
(1) i(vC) =
X
S22Nni
pi(S)iv
C(S)
with ivC(S) =

vC(S [ i)  vC(S)

, and i = 1; :::; n.
The idea is that each player enters the negotiation arena at random with the scope of
forming a coalition. Producing, and exchanging with other players implies forming a coalition
with them. A coalition S is random because players are supposed to enter a coalition at
random. The probability of any coalition S not containing i is pi(S) and it can be derived
from the entry probability distributions of all players.6 A probabilistic value assigns each
player her/his expected marginal contribution to the random coalition S. If for instance the
value (in dollars) of coalition S increases by ivC(S) = $5 when player i joins that coalition,
and the probability of forming that coalition is pi(S) = 25%, then player i expects to be
rewarded by $1:25. By randomizing over all coalitions one obtains total expected rewards
6Specically, call xj(t) the probability that player j has entered by time t 2 [0; 1], (j 2 N). The probability
that player i joins a coalition S  N n i, at time t, is:Y
j2S
SNni
xj(t)
Y
j =2S
SNni
(1  xj(t))  x0i(t)
and player i expects to join coalition S with probability:
pi(S) =
Z 1
0
Y
j2S
SNni
xj(t)
Y
j =2S
SNni
(1  xj(t))dxi(t)
Functions xj(t) represent players attitudes to enter a coalition early or late (cf. Owen, 1972, and
Monderer and Samet, 2002). One might think of xj(t) as a proxy of js attitudes during the negotiations
that lead to the formation of a coalition.
If the entry functions, xj(t), are di¤erent then pi(S) may depend on the identities of the members in S. The
idea is that when players have di¤erent attitudes, the probability to form a coalition S depends on who
are the players in it.
If all entry probabilities are uniform in [0; 1] (i.e., xj(t) = t for all j 2 N) then pi(S) = s!(n s 1)!n! (with
s = jSj, S  N) and (1) is the Shapley Value. In this case players behave symmetrically during negotiations.
Thus, for any S, the probability p(S) does not depend on the identitiesof the players in S. It can only
depend on the number of members, jSj.
Finally, observe that pi(S) does not depend on vC .
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of player i, i.e. i(vC). A division rule based on the probabilistic value is very general.
It is descriptive of a large variety of situations in which players expect to split the value
of their cooperation according to some reasonableassumptions. It can be characterized
axiomatically, where the axioms correspond to those assumptions.7 Therefore, the results in
this paper are quite general. Most of them are not robust to alternative division rules which
are not probabilistic values. However, such alternative rules would break, at least partially,
those reasonable assumptions.
Ichiishi (1993) uses the second-order di¤erence operator, 2kiv
C(S) = kv
C(S [ i)  
kv
C(S), to measure complementarity between is and ks assets. Throughout the paper we
will need to measure complementarity between ks assets and those under the control of a
generic coalition G. Thus we dene:
Denition 2. 2kGv
C(S) represents the complementarity between player k and the members
of coalition G, where 2kGv
C(S) = kv
C(S [G) kvC(S), (with k 2 N , G;S  N n k and
S \G = ;).
Roughly speaking, k is complementary to the members of G if ks resources are more
valuable whenever alsoGs resources are used. In this case, 2kGv
C(S) > 0. Complementarity
goes in both directions. It also implies that the value jointly added by members of G to
any other coalition S is higher in the presence of player k. If instead the value added by
k decreases when Gs resources are used, then the complementarity between k and G is
negative: 2kGv
C(S) < 0. We also say in this case that k is substitute of G.
An integration contract between i and j changes the control structure of their assets,
giving i the control of a share ji of js resource aj. Of course, a variety of integration
contracts may occur amongst subsets of agents. Here, we will consider only the e¤ect of
7Weber (1988) shows that, for a game v, a probabilistic value satises linearity, dummy and monotonicity
axioms. Linearity implies that a rational agent playing a game vw(:), such that vw(:) = v(:) + w(:), well
considers to receive from vw(:) the sum of gains he would receive from the two original games, v(:) and w(:).
The dummy axiom implies that if a player i contributes any coalition just v(i) then he will receive v(i).
Monotonicity requires that any player i never hurtsany coalition S: iv(S)  0. Webers results apply
to any game vC with general control structure C(S), as dened in the present paper.
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contracts between two agents, i and j, holding constant the control over the resources of
other agents. Thus, for simplicity ji =  2 (0; 1]. Formally:
Ci;j(S) 2 C is an integration contract between i and j that transfers a share  of js
assets under is control if for any S  N r ir j
Ci;j(S) = (ak)k2S
Ci;j(S [ i) = (ak)k2S [ fai + ajg
Ci;j(S [ j) = (ak)k2S [ f(1  )ajg
Ci;j(S [ i [ j) = (ak)k2S [ fai + aj; (1  )ajg
Let vC0(S) denote the pre-integration game, and let vC

i;j(S) be the game after the integration
contract between i and j. Di¤erently from Segal (2003), the above denition can describe
situations in which partner i acquires less than the full control of js resources, a situation
that typically occurs in minority stakes contracts. As in his model, an integration contract
is protable if it reduces all other playersexpected payo¤s:
(2) k(vC

i;j)  k(vC0) < 0
for any k 6= i; j. If  = 1, our denition coincides with Segals.
2.1. M&A contracts
An M&A is a contract that assigns rm i the total control of js resources. Thus  =
1. Let vC
=1
i;j (S)  vM&A(S). Through an M&A, player i can manage js resources even
in the absence of j. The complete $1.2B acquisition of Leap Wireless (the target j) by
AT&T (the acquiror i) in 2014 is an example of M&A. As pointed out earlier, this is the
collusion contract studied by Segal. As mentioned earlier, he showed that a collusion contract
(i.e., an M&A) is protable if for any third player k, the presence of player i lowers the
complementarity between k and j (Segal, 2003, p. 449). In the following proposition we
show that his protability condition, which is based on the sign of a third-di¤erence term,
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can be reformulated as a comparison between two terms. First, the complementarity between
k and the two partners, taken jointly. Second, the sum of the complementarity measures
between k and the two partners, separately. We make this reformulation in order to get
an empirically testable statement in which Segals condition is expressed as the sum of two
second di¤erences.
Proposition 1. AnM&A between i and j is protable if in the pre-integration game vC0 all
third parties k are less complementary to G = fi; jg than to i and j, separately: 2kfi;jgvC0(S) <
2kiv
C0(S) + 2kjv
C0(S), for all k and all S:
Proof. An M&A contract a¤ects the worth of those coalitions that contain only one of
the integrating parties. As regards playersmarginal contributions, they are a¤ected in the
following way:
1. Firm j becomes a null player in all coalitions.
2. Firm i contributes more than before to all coalitions, because it brings js resources.
3. Player ks marginal contributions are the following:
kv
M&A(S) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
kv
C0(S n j) for any S  N n i [ j
kv
C0(S [ j) for any S  N n j [ i
kv
C0(S) otherwise
The rst line represents the exclusione¤ect of collusion described by Segal (2003, p. 445).
The second line is the inclusion e¤ect (p. 447). The former occurs because player js
resources are excluded from coalitions that do not contain i. The latter occurs because
player i brings js resources also when j has not joined a coalition yet. Thus we can write
the variations in player ks marginal contributions:
kv
M&A(S) kvC0(S) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
kv
C0(S n j) kvC0(S) for any S  N n i [ j
kv
C0(S [ j [ i) kvC0(S [ i) for any S  N n j [ i
0 otherwise
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which can also be written as
(3) kvM&A(S) kvC0(S) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 2kjvC0(S) for any S  N n i [ j
2kjv
C0(S [ i) for any S  N n j [ i
0 otherwise
To understand (3), suppose k and j are complementary (i.e., 2kjv
C0(S) > 0). The rst line
in the RHS of (3) is a positive e¤ect for i and j. It tells us that ks marginal contributions to
coalitions that include j (and not i) decrease because now k has to wait for i. The second
line is a negative e¤ect for i and j. It says that ks marginal contributions to coalitions
that include i (and not j) increase, because now i has already brought js resources. Thus
ks contribution is larger. If k and j are substitutable (i.e., 2kjv
C0(S) < 0), the second
line represents a positive e¤ect for the two partners while the rst line is a negative. The
interpretation hinges on the fact that the M&A reduces detrimental competition between j
and k, but it also gives the latter the chance to steal part of the partnersmarket.
The M&A is protable if the rst e¤ect is larger than the second one, for all k and all S:
(4) 2kjv
C0(S [ i) 2kjvC0(S) < 0
In this case, (2) is satised for all k ( = 1). Let us re-write (4) as
kv
C0(S [ fi; jg) kvC0(S [ j) 

kv
C0(S [ i) kvC0(S)

< 0
Adding the zero-sum term kvC0(S) kvC0(S) and rearranging, yields
(5) 2kfi;jgv
C0(S) <

2kiv
C0(S) + 2kjv
C0(S)

which must be true for any k 6= i; j and all S  N n i n j n k.
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The complementarity between i and j is not su¢ cient to ensure protability of an M&A
contract. A su¢ cient condition is that (5) is satised for all k. To see the intuition, suppose
the two partners are complementary. They are more e¢ cient when they merge (i.e., the
productivity e¤ect is positive). However, it is perfectly possible either that the complemen-
tarity of ks resource increases giving k a larger hold-up power, or the substitutability to
k decreases, giving k more market power (e.g., business stealing e¤ect). In other words, it
is possible that ks resource becomes more essentialto the partners or less substitutable
from the customersviewpoint. If this occurs for all k, the strategic e¤ect is negative and an
M&A results in a loss of market power that may jeopardize the benets of integration. Fi-
nally observe that proposition 1 does not require players to have symmetric attitudes during
negotiations. It holds for any solution that is a probabilistic value.8
2.2. Minority stakes contracts
Through an integration contract, rm i acquires the control of a share aj of js assets
(  1). If 0 <  < 0:5, we say that the contract consists in a minority stakes integration. A
MS contract typically occurs when i is a minority shareholder of j, as in the case of AT&T
buying 32% of Net2Phone in 2000. As pointed out earlier, minority shareholders exert a
certain amount of inuence on the targets decision. With a high level of generality, we
parametrize is decisional inuence through the probability, , that i brings all js resources
with him when he enters any coalition S. More precisely, suppose i enters a coalition S 
N n i n j. With probability , he adds fai; ajg to all resources available to that coalition,
whereas with probability 1  he adds onlyfai; ajg. Realistically, the amount of inuence
 that a minority shareholder exerts on target j positively depends on the share size, .9
Proposition 2 below says that a MS contract is protable if it lowers the complementarity
8Cf. footnotes 6 and 7 above. Later it will become apparent that also propositions 2-4 do not require
symmetry.
9Of course, is decisional inuence can also depend on other factors, such as the level of fractionalization of
the other shareholders, or the credibility of is threat to sell aj to some opponent of js majority shareholder
(cf. Butz, 1994 and Hubbard and Palia, 1995).
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of third partiesresources with aj. In this case, the strategic e¤ect of a MS integration is
positive, because it makes third parties less essential to the partners.
Proposition 2. A minority stakes contract between i and j is protable if in the pre-
integration game vC0 any third partys resource ak is less complementary to fai; ajg than
to ai and aj, separately.
Proof. Let vMS(S) denote the post-integration characteristic function. Because of a minor-
ity stakes contract, ks expected contributions become
8><>: kv
MS(S) = kv
C0(S [ i [ j) + (1  )kvC0(S [ i [ j) with S [ i
kv
MS(S) = kv
C0(S) + (1  )kvC0(S [ j1 ) with S [ j
for any S  N n i n j n k, where S [ i [ j is a coalition S in which i brings also aj, and
S [ j1  is a coalition S in which j brings only the share (1 )aj of his own resources. The
expected variation in ks payo¤ is


kv
C0(S [ i [ j) kvC0(S [ i)

+ (1  )

kv
C0(S [ i [ j) kvC0(S [ i)

+ 

kv
C0(S n j) kvC0(S [ j)

+ (1  )

kv
C0(S [ j1 ) kvC0(S [ j)

= 

2kjv
C0(S [ i) 2kjvC0(S)

+ (1  )

2kjv
C0(S [ i) 2kjvC0(S [ j1 )

Replacing the di¤erence 2kjv
C0(S [ i) 2kjvC0(S) with the terms in (5) and requiring (2),
we get:
(6) 2kjv
C0(S [ i) 2kjvC0(S [ j1 ) <

   1

2kfi;jgv
C0(S) 2kivC0(S) 2kjvC0(S)

for all S  N n i n j n k and any k 2 N n i n j. Let us denote the LHS of (6) by y and the
di¤erence in square brackets of RHS by x. The MS contract is protable if
(7) y <

   1x
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By 0 <  < 1 it follows that 
 1 < 0. Thus inequality (7) is satised if y  0, or equivalently,
if
(8) 2kjv
C0(S [ i) < 2kjvC0(S [ j1 )
By proposition 2, the protability of a MS contract is independent of is decisional inuence,
. Eventually,  a¤ects the size of prots change, but not the sign of that change. The
protability of a MS is linked to the reduction of third partiescomplementarity with the
acquired share aj, when the latter is used jointly with ai. The intuition is the same as
in proposition 1. Parties become less essential or more substitutable, leading to a strategic
increase of partnersmarket power.
It is perfectly plausible that third parties become less essential or more substitutable
when i acquires the share aj, whereas this would not happen should i acquire the whole aj.
In general, a MS contract can be more protable than an M&A because it allows to integrate
exactly those assets that yield a larger strategice¤ect. The following proposition makes
this point, formally.
Proposition 3. A minority stakes contract between i and j is more protable than anM&A
contract if complementarity between ks assets and fai; ajg is lower in the absence of js
non-integrated resources, (1  )aj, than in the presence of these resources.
Proof. Consider x; y in (7) and let x < 0 (an M&A would be protable). Then, a MS
contract is preferable if the externality that it yields on any k is larger than the externality
produced by M&A, which yields
(9) (1  )y +   x < x =) y < x < 0
Inequality (9) implies
2kjv
C0(S [ i) 2kjvC0(S [ j1 ) < 2kfi;jgvC0(S) 2kivC0(S) 2kjvC0(S)
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or equivalently
kv
C0(S [ i [ j) kvC0(S [ i) + kvC0(S [ j1 ) kvC0(S [ j)
< kv
C0(S [ fi; jg) kvC0(S) kvC0(S [ i) + kvC0(S) + kvC0(S) kvC0(S [ j)
Rearranging the above inequality, we have
(10) 2
kfi;jgv
C0(S) < 2
kfi;jgv
C0(S [ j1 )
for all k 2 N n i n j and S  N n i n j n k.
Proposition 3 provides a theoretical explanation of our empirical result that MS contracts
have on average a larger positive impact on prots than M&A contracts.
2.3. JVs with joint ownership
Suppose two parent rms, i and j, confer an equal share  of their resources to form
a JV. We assume that the control of the JVs resources is assigned to i or j with equal
probability. This reects the idea that each player has a fty-fty inuence on JVs decisions.
The strategic e¤ect of a JV is positive if it either reduces third partiesability to hold-up
any of the two parents, or it increases their substitutability with the parent rms from the
customersviewpoint. Formally,
Proposition 4. A JV contract between i and j is protable if it lowers third partiescom-
plementarity with (al + am), where l;m = i; j and l 6= m.
Proof. The JV becomes the (n+1)th player in the game. The new control structure implies
the existence of an additional player. A coalition of all players including the new entity is
such that
Ci;j(N [ (n+ 1)) = fa1; :::; ai(1  ); :::; (1  )aj; :::; an; (ai + aj)g
By the JV contract, ks expected contributions are
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8><>: kv
JV (S) =

kv
C0(S [ i [ j) + kvC0(S [ i1 )

=2 with S [ i
kv
JV (S) =

kv
C0(S [ j [ i) + kvC0(S [ j1 )

=2 with S [ j
where player j1  is endowed with (1 )aj and player j is endowed with aj (similarly
for player i). By (2) the JV is protable if
(11) kvC0(S [ i1  [

i; j
	
) + kv
C0(S [ j1  [

i; j
	
) + kv
C0(S [ i1 )
+ kv
C0(S [ j1 )  2kvC0(S [ i)  2kvC0(S [ j) < 0
Adding the zero sum term
 kvC0(S [ i1 ) + kvC0(S [ i1 ) kvC0(S [ j1 ) + kvC0(S [ j1 )
Inequality (11) implies
(12) kiv
C0(S[i1 )+kjvC0(S[j1 ) > kfi;jgv
C0(S[i1 )+kfi;jgv
C0(S[j1 )
for all k 2 N n i n j and S  N n i n j n k.
This proposition suggests that if the conferred resources are optimally chosen, the JV
may lead to consistent increases in the market power of parent rms.
3. A measure of asset complementarity
Measuring complementarity/substitutability implies assessing how industries and rms
are related.10 This is notably quite a di¢ cult task. Many existing complementarity mea-
sures use industry codes, which provide only qualitative assessments. These measures are
commonly used to investigate the correlation between rmssectors and the occurrence of
integration contracts (Gort, 1962; Hassid, 1975; Berry, 1974; Jacquemin and Berry, 1979).
10Note that substitutability occurs when complementarity is negative.
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More sophisticated measures are based on concentric indexes (Caves et al., 1980 and Wern-
erfelt and Montgomery, 1988) and entropy indexes (Palepu, 1985). They have been used to
study diversication (e.g., Morck et al., 1990; Berger and Ofek, 1995), often in connection
with accounting data that are available by segment.
The above mentioned measures are of little use for our purpose, the reason being that
they are mainly based on the similarity in industry codes and therefore they are sometimes
ine¤ective in identifying complementarities among rms. Take for instance three-digit sectors
311 and 325. They are classied as unrelated. However, complementarity may still occur
at six-digit level. This is the case of oils-rening (NAICS 2007 6-digit code: 311225) and
petrochemical (6-digit code: 325110).
To address this kind of issues, we propose an alternative measure of complementarity
based on the inter-industry commodity ows.
3.1. Complementarity index for two multi-industry rms
More recently, Fan and Lang (2000) proposed a quantitative complementarity index based
on Input-Output (I-O) tables. Their complementarity measure between two industries l and
m, at time t, is an average of the degree of correlation between their input and output ows
from/to other industries:
(13) COMP t(l;m) =
corr(rtbl; r
t
bm) + corr(c
t
bl; c
t
bm)
2
where rtbl and r
t
bm are the percentages of sector bs output required to produce one dollar of
output in industries l and m respectively, and ctbl and c
t
bm are the percentages of l and ms
output used by b (with b 6= l;m).
Index (13) is quite appealing. However, it measures the complementarity between pairs
of rms belonging to one industry only. In fact, a large majority of rms in our sample
produces a variety of goods and/or services belonging to di¤erent industries. Each of them
is characterized by a specic level of complementarity with other industries. For this reason,
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we start from the work of Fan and Lang and we build a measure of complementarity which
accounts for the possibility that rms operate in more than one industry.
Consider two rms i and j in our sample. The i and js products are included in a
number of industries: l = 1; :::; L and m = 1; :::;M , respectively. Let il be the output of rm
i in sector l and jm the output of rm j in sector m. In a given year t, our complementarity
index between multi-industry rms i and j is:
(14) COMP ti;j =
1
L M
LX
l=1
MX
m=1
Rtj  COMP t(il; jm)
where COMP t(il; jm) is built using (13). Roughly speaking, (14) translatesthe comple-
mentarity between two sectors into complementarity between two rms. Complementarity
between two rms is high if they sell their products to (or buy their inputs from) other rms
in highly complementary sectors. Moreover, if the two rms do business in several sectors,
their degree of complementarity is a weighted average of the complementarity among those
sectors.
Index (14) detects variations in complementarity resulting from technological changes,
or rmsstrategic choices (e.g., the launch of a new product or the desertion of an old one).
The value of Rtj represents js share of the two partnerstotal operating revenue turnover
in year t. It gives an idea of contribution that rm j makes to the joint activities with i.
Notice that COMP ti;j can also be negative. In this case rms i and j are substitutable.
Let us now explain in what respect index COMP ti;j is related to the second-order dif-
ference operator 2ijv
C(S) that we use in the protability conditions of propositions 1-4 in
section 2. By Ichiishi (1993), complementarity between i and j is given by the change in
is marginal contribution to the value of a coalition. The change is due to the presence of
j. Formally, 2ijv
C(S) = iv
C(S [ j)   ivC(S). The higher the value i can add to a set
S of rms when also j does business with those rms, the higher is complementarity with
j. In this case we expect is business to be positively correlated with js business. In other
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words, since is contribution is positively a¤ected by the presence of j, then i is more likely
to sell output to (or to buy inputs from) rms in certain sectors when also j does business
with rms in those sectors. Vice versa, if i and j are substitute, we expect is business to be
negatively correlated with js business.
Given a set of rms S with which i and j do business, the higher the correlation between is
and js inter-industry relationships with members of S, as measured by terms COMP t(il; jm)
in formula (14), the higher 2ijv
C(S). This explains how correlations in the input-output
tables are related to variations in the characteristic function, vC . Ultimately, it explains why
2ijv
C(S) and COMP t(il; jm) should be positively related.
Now observe that 2ijv
C(S) depends on S. In fact, propositions 1-4 present protability
conditions that hinge on variations of2ijv
C(S). Those conditions must hold for all coalitions
S. If this is the case, they hold also for the sum of 2ijv
C(S) over all S. By (14), our
complementarity index COMP ti;j represents a weighted sum of complementarity indexes
COMP t(il; jm) over all i and js activities based on the sectors where they sell their products
or buy their inputs. Thus, COMP ti;j represents a proxy of the sum of 
2
ijv
C(S) over all
coalitions S. We provide further details on this point while discussing the empirical strategy
in subsection 5.1.
For a better understanding of how index COMP ti;j works and how it maps to the model
in section 2, consider the following example. In 2007 the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, a com-
pany which has a long tradition in the design, development and manufacture of innovative
and advanced technologies for commercial, industrial, defense and energy markets, acquired
the stock of Benshaw Advanced Controls & Drives for approximately $102 million. Ben-
shaw operates in the design, development and manufacture of mission critical motor control
and protection product solutions for leading original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and
industrial customers.
The primary NAICS 2007 codes for Curtiss-Wright are: 332812 (Metal Coating, En-
graving and Allied Services to Manufacturers); 334413 (Semiconductor and Related Device
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Manufacturing) and 33641 (Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing). For Benshaw:
3345 (Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instruments Manufacturing).
Curtiss-Wright is the acquiror i (with a number L = 3 of activities) while Benshaw is
the target j (with M = 1 activities). Since the I-O Tables refer to the 3-digit codes of 2007
classication, we dene sectors as follows: i1 = 332, i2 = 334, i3 = 336 and j1 = 334.
We use formula (13) to compute index COMP t(l;m) between each sector l of i and
each sector m of j, for years t = 2006, 2007 (see results in table 1). Consider the rst
year 2006. The operating revenue turnover amounts to $939 million for Curtiss-Wright and
$52 million for Bensham, implying that the Benshams contribution to the total operating
revenue is about 5:5%, therefore R2006j = 0:05. By (14), the complementarity index between
Curtiss-Wright and Bensham (i and j, respectively) is
COMP 2006i;j =
1
L M R
2006
j 

COMP 2006(i1; j1) + COMP
2006(i2; j1) + COMP
2006(i3; j1)

=
0:05
3
 (0:2073 + 1:0000 + 0:1660) = 0:0251
In the same way, we also compute the value for year 2007. Table 1 shows all results.
Table 1: Complementarity index between Curtiss-Wright and Benshaws in period
2006-2007.
Year 2006 Year 2007
COMP 2006(i1; j1) 0:2073 COMP
2007(i1; j1) 0:2162
COMP 2006(i2; j1) 1:0000 COMP
2007(i2; j1) 1:0000
COMP 2006(i3; j1) 0:1660 COMP
2007(i3; j1) 0:1547
R2006j 0:0550 R
2007
j 0:0600
COMP 2006i;j 0:0251 COMP
2007
i;j 0:0274
The complementarity index between Curtiss-Wright and Bensham is quite low in the two
years: only 0:0251 in 2006 and 0:0274 in 2007. The reason is twofold.
First, values COMP t(il; jm) in the weighted sum of index (14) are rather low: always
below 0:22, except for sector 334, which is the sector where the two partners almost perfectly
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overlap either in terms of inputs required or in terms of markets to which they sell their
products. As a consequence, should an integration contract between the two companies
occur, synergies and business opportunities between the two companies appear to be modest.
Second, Benshams share Rtj of total operating revenue turnover is very low (never above
6%). It implies that, in the case of integration, the contribution of Bensham to Curtiss-
Wrights business is expected to be relatively small.
3.2. Complementarity in the presence of third parties
The model of section 2 points out that benets from an integration contract are due
not only to complementarity between i and j, but also to possible changes in complemen-
tarity/substitutability between them and any third party, k. To evaluate empirically the
strategic e¤ects of integration, we build complementarity indexes based on a weighted av-
erage of is (or js) complementarity indexes with any third party k. The complementarity
between i and third parties ks (in year t) is
(15) Ckit =
X
K
RtkCOMP
t
k;i
The weights Rtk account for the relative importance of third parties in our sample. Speci-
cally, Rtk is the share of the total operating revenue turnover of k, andK is the set of all third
parties k 6= i; j. Index Ckit is a proxy for the average of the di¤erence operator 2kivC(S).
Similarly, we also dene Ckjt, proxy for the average of 2kjv
C(S).11 Using indexes COMP tk;i,
COMP tk;j and COMP
t
i;j, we build index Ckij
t, that represents the complementarity between
partners, taken together, and third parties:
(16) Ckijt =
X
K
RtkCOMP
t
k;i  COMP ti;j +
X
K
RtkCOMP
t
k;j  COMP ti;j
11Specically,
Ckjt =
X
K
RtkCOMP
t
k;j
.
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Index Ckijt is a proxy for the average of 2kfi;jgv
C(S), the post-integration complementarity,
and it will be required to test condition (5) for M&A contracts.
Following the same steps, we dene complementarity indexes needed to test protability
conditions for MS and JV contracts. For example, suppose i acquires a minority share  of
js resources. A proxy for the average of 2
kj
vC(S [ j1 ) in (8) is:
(17) Ckj;t =
X
K[j1 
RtkCOMP
t
kj
Observe that in the case of MS or JV, the target rm j controls resources (1   )aj inde-
pendently of i. In other words, as far as (1 )aj are concerned, j can be considered a third
party from the point of view of the integrating partners. This the reason why index (17)
includes j1  in the set of third parties K.
All indexes above belong to the interval [ 1; 1]. They are time varying, because I-O
Tables are updated yearly.
4. The sample and some descriptive statistics
Data come from databases Orbis and Zephyr (Bureau Van Dijk) and refer to 8106 US
listed companies that signed a bilateral contract of M&A (416 units), MS (6495) or JV
(1195) in the period 2002-2007. Contracts involved companies operating in 90 di¤erent
primary industrial sectors (NAICS 2007 6-digit classication).12 Including the secondary
rm activities, the M&A and MS contracts occurred in 105 di¤erent industrial sectors,
whereas the JVs were recorded in 58 sectors. Table 2 provides a classication of integration
contracts by completion year.
12In the nal Appendix we provide the sample characteristics of top four business sectors for each of the
three contracts (see table 9).
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Table 2: Sample decomposition by year of integration.
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
M&A 24 43 49 118 99 83 416
MS 519 766 690 1334 2887 299 6495
JV 120 167 245 199 207 257 1195
Total 663 976 984 1651 3193 639 8106
The largest number of deals have been completed in year 2005 in the case of M&A (118
out of 416), in 2006 for MS purchases (2887=6495) and 2007 for JVs (257=1195). All together,
the contracts signed in this period 2005-2007 cover the 40:2% of the sample.
Descriptive statistics on size, deal value and performance are reported in Table 3. Data
concern rms between the 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution, in the year before
integration.13 The variables we used as proxies for size (i.e., number of employees, enterprise
value, total assets, sales) conrm that on average rms engaging in an M&A are smaller
than in case of MS or JV. For instance, the 75th percentile for the number of employees is
only 750 for M&As, whereas this value rises to more than 28000 for MS and to 41200 for
JV contracts. Not surprisingly, this ranking in size also reects the average value of deals by
contract (notice that the 75th percentile for JVs is in this case almost eight times the value
for M&As, while that for MS purchases is more than double).
Firms choosing M&A integration are also the least performing: the 75% of them show an
annual ROA (return on assets) not higher than 1:50%, compared to a value of 7:34% for MS
purchases and 6:50% for JVs. This scenario does not change when performance is measured
by using ROSF (return on shareholders funds) or EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes).
13The nal Appendix provides denitions of all reported data.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: Interquartile ranges of data related to the pre-integration
year.
M&A MS JV
Percentiles Percentiles Percentiles
25 75 25 75 25 75
Employment 45 750 453 28048 987 41200
Enterprise value ($bil) 0:03 2:60 0:23 9:41 0:39 18:30
Total assets ($bil) 0:02 0:81 0:25 14:70 0:48 11:50
Sales ($bil) 0:03 1:02 0:02 7:65 0:76 25:40
Deal value ($mil) 0:60 12:00 4:67 26:55 3:84 92:04
ROSF (%)  24:50 15:00 2:33 25:00  4:80 23:00
ROA (%)  0:61 1:50 0:00 7:34 0:00 6:50
EBIT (%)  1:01 2:26  0:03 7:86 0:10 8:00
Table 4 shows that rms signing an M&A contract look for partners with a higher degree
of complementarity. These data are consistent with our conjecture that rms involved in
MSs or JVs are relatively less motivated by the chance to benet from positive productivity
e¤ects and relatively more attracted by potential strategic e¤ects on third parties.
Table 4: Complementarity index between partners. Descriptive statistics by integration
contract (t = pre-integration year).
M&A
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
COMP ti;j 0:0013 0:0355  0:0680 0:5887
MS
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
COMP ti;j 0:0002 0:0066  0:0351 0:4116
JV
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
COMP ti;j 0:0005 0:0081  0:0412 0:1600
Further support to our conjecture comes from table 5. It presents the correlation of
partnerscomplementarity index, COMP ti;j, with both the size and the performance of inte-
grating rms. As far as an M&A is concerned, correlation is signicantly negative. Instead,
the correlation is weakly positive for minority stakes contracts, while it is or not signicant
for JVs.
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Table 5: Correlation of partnerscomplementarity index with rm size and performance (t
= pre-integration year).
COMP ti;j M&A MS JV
Employees  0:34 0:63 0:00
Total assets  0:10 0:03 0:05
ROA  0:12 0:08 0:05
ROSF  0:30 0:19 0:15
* Signicant at 5% (p < 0:05).
5. Empirical evidence
5.1. Strategy
We use panel data to test if the protability conditions derived in section 2 are signi-
cantly and positively correlated with rmsperformance, in case of integration. Specically,
we want to test whether and how performance is related to changes in partnerscomplemen-
tarity with third parties.
Protability conditions hinge on variations in second-order di¤erences of the characteristic
function, due to change in the control structure. As pointed out in subsection 3.1, the time
varying idiosyncratic terms in the empirical model are intended to capture those factors that
shape the characteristic function vC(S) in the theoretical model, and ultimately the degree of
complementarity/substitutability between members of S. This is how the empirical analysis
maps to the theoretical model (cf. further discussion on this point below).
Using the Input-Output Accounts Data available from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), we measure complementarity/substitutability relationships dened in sec-
tion 3.14 For each company, we take into account up to 8 di¤erent business lines ranked by
relevance in terms of revenues.
We compare the performance of our sample to that of a controlgroup including 33212
non-integrating companies. For each contract, this set of rms is used as a counterfactual
14It is worth mentioning that when complementarity indexes are negative (e.g., index (14) or (15)), then
rms are substitutable. In this case, by lower complementarity we mean higher substitutability.
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to evaluate the relative performance of integrating rms, which we call treated. Similarity
between control and treated units is based on estimated treatment probabilities, known as
propensity scores (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Propensity score matching is imple-
mented by using a logit on a vector X of rm pre-treatment characteristics.
In this vector we include proxy variables for i) size (number of employees, sales, xed and
total assets, operating revenue turnover, enterprise value); ii) quality of companys income
(cash ow); iii) protability (EBIT, gross prot, value added, ROSF), and nally a sectoral
dummy variable that takes into account the companiesindustrial activities. Once we have
checked that the balancing property is satised15, we estimate the joint impact of integration
contracts and protability conditions on the rm performance.
This matching procedure addresses a self-selection problem concerning the choice of the
contract. We assume that rms do not choose their contracts based on some known changes
in complementarities or some rm characteristics. Accordingly, we do not run regressions
designed to test the decision of signing a specic contract conditional to our protability
conditions (5), (8) and (12). Rather, we test whether these conditions are really e¤ective,
which implies assessing their impact on the partnersperformance once the contract has been
chosen. Thus we use propensity score matching to randomize the choice of contracts in our
sample and nally test the impact of protability conditions.
The dependent variable in the empirical model is ROA (return on assets), the ratio
between a companys annual earnings and its total assets. As contracts have important
implications on some characteristics of the rms (e.g., size, e¢ ciency, productivity), we
use a dynamic model for panel data which takes into account autocorrelation in the vari-
able measuring rm performance. We adopt the dynamic GMM proposed by Blundell and
Bond (1998), where variables are instrumented by using their lagged and non-lagged rst-
di¤erences.16 For each company i we set a time varying dummy Tit taking value of 1 from
15The balancing property requires that treated and controls have on average the same characteristics.
16For predetermined and endogenous variables, two is the maximum number of lags used as instruments.
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the generic year t in which integration occurs. This variable takes always value 0 for non-
integrated rms belonging to counterfactual group.
The model is:
(18) ROAit = ROAit 1 + 1SIZEit + 2Tit  PCit + 3TCit + i + yt + it
The row vector SIZEit includes variables SALESit (net sales, in natural log), EMPLit
(number of employees, in natural log) and their rst order lags.
As rst step, we use model (18) to test the general protability requirements from propo-
sitions 1, 2 and 4 in section 2. Then, in section 5.3, we implement the ANOVA technique
to check whether a MS contract is more protable than M&A when condition (10) holds, as
suggested by proposition 3.
To test theoretical predictions we use the interaction term Tit  PCit, where PCit is a
dummy indicating whether the protability condition associated with contract Tit is satised
or not in year t. For example, consider an M&A contract. Inequality (5) is the protability
condition associated with this contract. It says that a su¢ cient condition for protability is
that the M&A reduces the partnerscomplementarity with all third parties in our sample.
Using indexes dened in section 3, this condition implies Ckijt < Ckit + Ckjt. If this
inequality holds, then the dummy variable PCit takes value 1 for company i. Hence, through
the interaction term Tit  PCit we can evaluate how protability conditions correlate with
post-integration prots.
For each company i, and any period t, vector TCit in (18) is composed of interactions
of Tit with the following three complementarity indexes. First, COMP ti;j dened by (14)
measures complementarity between i and j. It assesses mutual benets eventually arising
from merging partners assets (the productivity e¤ect), without taking into account any
possible e¤ect due to changes in the complementarity with third parties (e.g., the strategic
e¤ect). Second, index Ckit measures complementarity between partner i and all third parties,
29
k. Specically, for year t, the complementarity index Ckit is dened by (15). The third index
Ckjt is dened in the same way, where i = j. All of these three complementarity indexes
are time varying.17 Finally,  and y in (18) represent rm and time specic e¤ects;  is the
usual disturbance term.
5.2. Results
Columns (1)-(3) in table 6 show results of our regressions for M&A, MS and JV contracts,
respectively. To save notation, hereafter we omit dimension i and t for variables referring to
panel data. For each contract, we disentangle the productivity and strategic e¤ect in order to
assess their relative importance. The productivity e¤ect is captured by the interaction term
T  COMPi;j, while the strategic e¤ect operates through the three interactions of variable
T with dummy variable PC and the complementarity indexes Cki, Ckj.
We nd evidence that post-integration prots are higher when our theoretical protability
conditions are satised. The variable of interest is T PC, the interaction between the two
dummies for treatment and protability conditions. Prots increase on average by 1:51%
and 2:18% for MS and JV, respectively (cf. table 6, Columns 2 and 3). These percentages
are higher than the average 1:45% for an M&A.
Coe¢ cients for treatment variable T are signicantly negative in all cases, especially for
JVs, where the average loss is about 2%. This result suggests that integration contracts do
not yield higher prots per se. If instead protability conditions are satised, integration
contracts are associated with higher prots. The interaction term T  PC is a rst channel
to capture the strategic e¤ect of integration contracts empirically. Additional strategic gains
come from changes in the complementarity/substitutability between each partner and third
parties. The impact is measured by interactions T  Cki and T  Ckj. Cumulating the
impacts of these channels, we can evaluate the relative strength of strategic and productivity
e¤ects for each contract.
17We do not include in our regressions the complementarity index Ckijt, dened by (16), because it is a
linear combination of Ckit, Ckjt and COMP ti;j , so giving rise to a multicollinearity problem.
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In an M&A prots increase on average by 4:50% for every increase of the complementar-
ity between the acquiror i and third parties, as measured by T Cki, and by 0:37% for every
decrease of complementarity between the target and third parties (T Ckj). The produc-
tivity e¤ectis the e¤ect of partnerscomplementarity, as measured by T  COMPi;j. For
M&A contracts, the average e¤ect is strongly negative ( 4:33%). These results suggest that
the perspective of gaining from the strategic e¤ects produced by the integration represents
a strong motivation to sign an M&A contract. This motivation may be stronger than the
prospect of achieving productivity gains.
In the case of MS contracts the largest impact from strategic e¤ect is related to the
substitutability between target j and third parties, as measured by the coe¢ cient value
of T  Ckj. A decrease in their complementarity index (or alternatively, any increase in
substitutability) is associated with a 4:58% increase in prots, on average. These gains
are on top of those coming from protability condition PC (+1:51%). They outweigh the
productivity e¤ect, which is negative also for this type of contract. The value of coe¢ cient
for variable T COMPi;j is  4:71. Thus, as for M&As, also for MS contracts a substantial
increase in prots is associated with the strategic e¤ects on competitors and trading parties.
In the case of a JV, any increase in Ckj guarantees additional returns of 3:51 percentage
points (see Column 3 in table 6). Eventually, these gains can be added to those from the
protability condition (2:18 percentage points). Di¤erently from the other two contracts,
complementarity between partners has a positive e¤ect on post-integration performance.
The coe¢ cient value for T  COMPi;j is +2:50. Thus the productivity e¤ect is positive.
However, as for the other two contracts, the strategic e¤ect appears to be a strong motivation
of the choice of forming a JV.
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Table 6: Complementarity and post-integration performance.
Dynamic GMM (Blundell-Bond, 1998) estimators.
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. ROA M&A MS JV
ROA(t  1) 0:0939 0:2000 0:1602
(0:0010) (0:0078) (0:0047)
SALES 0:0005 0:0000 0:0000
(0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0000)
SALES(t  1)  0:0001  0:0000  0:0000
(0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0000)
EMPL  0:2067  0:0000  0:0002
(0:0041) (0:0000) (0:0000)
EMPL(t  1)  0:0447 0:0001 0:0001
(0:0031) (0:0000) (0:0000)
T  1:6415  0:6963  2:0651
(0:0949) (0:2888) (0:2498)
PC  0:1271  0:2384 0:4500
(0:0369) (0:1770) (0:1058)
T  PC 1:4537 1:5132 2:1796
(0:1928) (0:4459) (0:2696)
T  COMPi;j  4:3349  4:7086 2:5050
(2:3387) (0:7641) (0:1623)
T  Cki 4:4917  1:8978 1:4446
(0:4644) (1:3058) (1:0128)
T  Ckj  0:3668  4:5773 3:5149
(0:0650) (1:6669) (1:1796)
Const: 1:1607 0:6952 1:5070
(0:0675) (0:2244) (0:4274)
N 1635 32262 6910
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
Data for complementarity indexes are 100. All regressions include rm and time xed e¤ects.
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5.3. Average e¤ect of protability conditions
Within the sample of rms that signed an integration contract in the period 2002-2007
we distinguish between treated and controls. A treated rm satises the protability
requirement associated with its contract, therefore the treatment group includes all rms
such that the dummy variable PC takes value 1 starting from the year of integration. The
controlgroup includes rms that do not satisfy their protability conditions, that is all
units such that the dummy variable PC takes value 0.
Thus we explore the impact of protability conditions once rms have chosen their con-
tract. Basically, our analysis involves two counterfactuals for a single set of integrated rms.
The rst counterfactual is related to the choice of a specic integration contract than an-
other. The second is related to changes in complementarity relationships but conditioning
on the contract that rms have chosen. In order to ensure similarity between treated and
controls, we implement the same propensity score matching presented in section 5. Namely,
we use a logit on a vector of twelve pre-treatment variables that summarize the main features
of rms in our sample.
Then we estimate the Average Treatment E¤ect (ATE), which requires nding matches
for both the treated and the control units, and the Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated
(ATET ), which in turn only requires nding matches for the treated. The post-integration
period includes three years after the contract completion date and performance is measured
by using ROA (return on assets). Results in table 7 support theoretical predictions. When
protability conditions are satised, a signicant increase in the rate of return occurs. The
ATE is about +1:73 percentage points in the rst post-integration year, and even higher
(+1:87%) in the second year. This boost e¤ect disappears in the third year. Over all three
years, the returns after integration grow by +1:30% a year, at 1% level of signicance.
When matching treated and control only on the treated (ATET ), results are quite similar.
The impact is slightly lower in the rst post-integration year, +1:60%, but higher in the
second year, where the protability conditions guarantee an extra gain of +2:20%. On
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average, returns grow by +1:20% a year.
Finally, we test whether a MS is associated with a larger increase in prots compared to
an M&A, provided that the MS contract signicantly reduces the complementarity between
acquiror and third parties (i.e., condition (10) holds). For this purpose, we consider a
subsample of rms that satisfy both the protability conditions (5) and (10) in the year of
integration. For these rms, both M&As and MSs are associated with an increase in prots.
Then we use the analysis of variance (ANOVA) to compare the average performance of
rms choosing the two di¤erent contracts. Table 8 shows the results. The one-way ANOVA
highlights a boost e¤ect from MS contracts. The probability (p-value) associated with the
di¤erences between groups is less than 0:01 (see Sig. level in table 8). Therefore di¤erences
between the two contracts are valid and statistically signicant at 1%. When rms choose
a MS contract the average ROA is higher: 3:63 percentage points more than an M&A.
Interestingly, this boost e¤ect still amounts to 2:62% for rms choosing a JV contract.
Table 7: Average Treatment E¤ect (ATE) and Average Treatment E¤ect on Treated
(ATET) from integration Protability Conditions.
Dep. ROA ATE
Post-integration years: All t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1:280 1:728 1:868 0:204
(0:000) (0:013) (0:023) (0:733)
ATET
1:162 1:557 2:197  0:150
(0:002) (0:040) (0:019) (0:808)
N 9022 2266 2248 2253
Notes. Treated: PC = 1; Controls: PC = 0.
*** p <0:01, ** p <0:05, * p <0:1; p-values in parentheses.
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Table 8: ANOVA for post-integration performance.
Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig.
Between groups 10396:0441 2 5198:0220 36:76 0:0000
Within groups 2466364:22 17441 141:41186
Pairwise comparisons of the means (Bonferronis method):
M&A 0 (base)
MS +3:630
JV +2:618
Notes. Treatment variable includes three categories: M&A, MS and JV.
The subsample includes rms that satisfy protability conditions (5) and (10) for M&A and MS.
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
35
6. Conclusions
In this paper we adopt the approach of cooperative game theory to study integration
contracts. We build on the seminal work of Segal (2003) by extending it in two directions.
First, we consider integration contracts that pool less than 100% of partners resources.
Second, we provide empirical evidence of theoretical predictions.
In the model, integration may yield two e¤ects. First, it may enhance e¢ ciency, due
to complementarity between partners resources (i.e., the productivity e¤ect). Second, it
may increase partnersmarket power, by making competitorsand other partiesresources
less essential (i.e., the strategic e¤ect). A minority stakeholding or a JV can be more prof-
itable than an M&A. The reason is that pooling less than 100% resources may yield a larger
strategic e¤ect, compared to full integration. It can allow partners to decrease third parties
complementarity (or increase their substitutability) by a larger amount. Third partiescon-
tributions become less valuable than in the case of an M&A. Thus integrating partners gain
more market power and higher prots.
In order to provide empirical evidence, we use a large sample of US quoted companies. We
develop an index based on the I-O coe¢ cients to measure complementarity/substitutability
among rms. This index is time varying and applies to multi-product rms.
We nd that prots are higher when theoretical protability conditions are satised.
The productivity e¤ect is negative for M&A and MS contracts, while it is positive for JVs.
The strategic e¤ect is positive, and it is relatively more important for partial integration
contracts than for M&As. These results support our conjecture that the strategic e¤ect may
yield consistent increase in prots, even in the presence of limited e¢ ciency gains. Moreover,
minority stakes contracts and JVs are likely to lead to larger accumulation of market power,
compared to M&As.
From a normative viewpoint, our results on strategic implications of MS and JV con-
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tracts imply that the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholding (and the strategic
alliances as well) are more likely to harm competition and then consumers, compared to
M&A contracts. However, antitrust legislation is quite heterogeneous across countries on
this issue. In some countries (e.g., the US, Japan, UK or Germany), the Competition Au-
thorities are given the competence to review any kind of minority acquisitions. In other
jurisdictions (e.g., the European Commission or some EU members), the authorities cannot
investigate minority shareholdings which do not lead to the acquisition of full control.
There is not much consensus about the potential harms of minority shareholding. Perhaps
the theoretical framework and the empirical ndings of this paper help shed light on these
important normative issues.
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Appendix A. Sample characteristics of top four Business Sectors
Table 9 below shows that most of rms engaged in M&A and JV contracts operate in
the sector of Professional, Scientic and Technical Services (NAICS 3-digit code 541). In the
group of M&As, the average ROA is negative ( 2:25%) and the partnerscomplementarity
degree (computed in the pre-integration year) is very high, on average it takes a value
of 0:70. In the group of JVs the average performance is still negative but the partners
complementarity index is very low, only 0:09. Looking at the MS contracts, the largest
number of rms belong to the Sector of Financial activities (NAICS 3-digit code 523). These
rms perform much better (the ROA is +1:42% on average) and the complementarity degree
is still very low, only 0:01.
Table 9: Sample characteristics of top four Business Sectors* by number of integration
contracts (average values in the pre-integration year).
M&A
Sectors: 541 524 561 522 All
No. of rms 132 26 25 21 6
COMP ti;j 0:700  0:200 0:0900 0:080 0:100
ROA  2:25  0:65  1:18  4:07  1:70
Employees 160 80 121 170 305
MS
Sectors: 523 334 541 561 All
No. of rms 2587 577 569 308 89
COMP ti;j 0:010 0:040 0:080 0:090 0:020
ROA 1:42 9:45 2:35 2:57 3:30
Employees 6345 751 1037 152 11580
JV
Sectors: 541 325 523 531 All
No. of rms 111 86 84 72 16
COMP ti;j 0:090 0:002 0:001 0:200 0:050
ROA  2:78 2:84 1:13 1:67 1:80
Employees 103 2078 298 91 1957
 NAICS 2007 3-digit codes. See table 10 below for Sector denitions.
These data support the main insight of section 4: basically, small and less performing
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rms choose M&A contracts, probably in hopes of getting an increase in size and productivity
through highly complementary partners. On the contrary, the partners complementarity
seems to be a minor issue for larger and more e¢ cient rms choosing MS or JV.
Table 10: Naics 2007 2- and 3-digit top four Business Sector denitions.
Sector Denition
31  33 Manufacturing
325 Chemical Manufacturing
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
52 Finance and Insurance
522 Credit Intermediation and Related Activities
523 Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Fin. Inv. and Related Activities
524 Insurance Carriers and Related Activities
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
531 Real Estate
54  541 Professional, Scientic, and Technical Services
56 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services
561 Administrative and Support Services
Appendix B. Data
Sources: Bureau van Dijk (BVD) Databases Orbis and Zephyr and own calculations
based on I-O Tables for US (IO).
B1. Regressions and average treatment e¤ects in section 5
ROA, BVD: Quarterly net income annualized, and then divided by total assets. Sig-
nicant negative or persistently low returns suggest nancial weakness.
Sales, BVD: The dollar volume of transactions involving company products and services
net of returns, allowances and sales discounts (net sales).
Employment, BVD: Number of employees.
Treated T, Dummy variable: BVD: 1 if deal completed (M&A, MS or JV) where
deals are mutually exclusive.
Protability condition PC, Dummy variable: IO: 1 if one of the following condi-
tions is satised:
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 condition (5) for M&A
 condition (8) for MS
 condition (12) for JV
where M&A, MS and JV contracts are mutually exclusive.
Partnerscomplementarity index COMP ti;j, IO: dened by formula (14).
Complementarity index between partner i and all third parties, k Ckit, IO:
dened by formula (15).
Complementarity index between target j and all third parties, k Ckjt, IO:
dened by formula in footnote 11.
B2. Sample and pre-treatment characteristics (section 4 and subsections 5.1,
5.3)
EBIT, BVD: Earnings before interest and taxes, is a measure of a rms prot that
includes all expenses except interest and income tax expense.
Total assets, BVD: The total of all assets owned by a company. These things might
be liquid assets such as cash and short-term investments, physical assets such as buildings,
trucks, inventories of products and equipment or intangible assets such as goodwill, trade-
marks and patents.
Deal value, BVD: is essentially the price that one party will pay for the other, or the
value that one side will give up to make the transaction work.
Enterprise value, BVD: is a measure of a companys total value, often used as a
more comprehensive alternative to equity market capitalization. The market capitalization
of a company is simply its share price multiplied by the number of shares a company has
outstanding. Enterprise value is calculated as the market capitalization plus debt, minority
interest and preferred shares, minus total cash and cash equivalents.
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Fixed assets, BVD: are a long-term tangible piece of property that a rm owns and
uses in the production of its income and is not expected to be consumed or converted into
cash any sooner than at least one years time. Fixed assets are sometimes collectively referred
to as plant. Fixed assets can include buildings, computer equipment, software, furniture,
land, machinery and vehicles.
Cash ow, BVD: is the net amount of cash and cash-equivalents moving into and out of
a business. Positive cash ow indicates that a companys liquid assets are increasing, enabling
it to settle debts, reinvest in its business, return money to shareholders, pay expenses and
provide a bu¤er against future nancial challenges.
Gross prot, BVD: is the proportion of money left over from revenues after accounting
for the cost of goods sold, where cost of goods sold represents the cost of materials, labor
and factory overhead needed to bring to a marketable state the goods that have been sold.
Operating revenue turnover, BVD: is the revenue a company receives in the course
of its normal operations. Examples include sales and commissions, as well as other things
that may vary according to the time of business revenue.
Value added, BVD: describes the enhancement a company gives its product or service
before o¤ering the product to customers. Value-added applies to instances where a rm takes
a product that may be considered a homogeneous product, with few di¤erences (if any) from
that of a competitor, and provides potential customers with a feature or add-on that gives
it a greater sense of value.
Return On Shareholders Funds (ROSF), BVD: is a measure of the prot for
the period which is available to the owners stake in a business, therefore is a measure of
protability. Industry investors quote the ROSF ratio as a percentage. ROSF is calculated
as: ROSF = ((Net prot after taxation & preference dividend) / ( Ordinary share capital +
Reserves)) x 100.
44
